Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics, University of Florence, Florence , Italy
Abstract
Abstract
We analyse how bicameralism can affect national fiscal policies in a federal country when vertical and horizontal externalities interact. Conditions are provided to show when, at equilibrium, the two chambers agree or disagree on the choice of a national capital tax rate, depending on whether or not the pivotal voter in the two chambers is the same.
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
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