On the Morality of Enjoying Simulated Rape with Robots and by Other Fictional Means

Abstract

ABSTRACTI argue that there is no morally relevant difference, based solely on motivation for enjoyment, between enjoying simulated rape with a sexbot compared to other media. In defence of this claim, I distinguish between two types of enjoyment – enjoyment qua simulation and enjoyment qua substitution – and further claim that each type of enjoyment shares corresponding similarities with either idle or surrogate fantasies. Given this, the enjoyment of one's rape fantasy is, I contend, immoral if one enjoys qua substitution one's surrogate fantasy about (for example) sexualized enslavement and rape, but not if one enjoys qua simulation one's idle fantasy about the same sexualized enslavement and rape. I therefore conclude that whether one's enjoyment is immoral depends on the motivation for the enjoyment and the type of fantasy one creates to procure it (where the motivation for enjoyment and fantasy share the same desire), and not the media used to facilitate one's fantasy and subsequent enjoyment.