Affiliation:
1. Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods Università Degli Studi di Milano Milan Italy
2. School of Economics Shanghai University Shanghai China
3. Southampton Business School University of Southampton Southampton UK
Abstract
AbstractWe investigate the impact of the Dodd–Frank Act (DFA) on the credit risk behavior of complex bank holding companies (BHCs). Specifically, we assess the effectiveness of the DFA in reducing the credit riskiness of complex banks. Consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis, we find that complex BHCs affected by the DFA increase their credit risk. We argue that possible explanations are that BHCs decreased their lending portfolio quality, loan monitoring, and strength and independence of the risk management function after the DFA. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns, different sample selection criteria, various model and treatment specifications, and placebo tests.
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