False‐Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games: Empirical and Theoretical Analysis-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

False‐Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games: Empirical and Theoretical Analysis

Published:2016-07-05 Issue:3 Volume:33 Page:478-506
ISSN:0824-7935
Container-title:Computational Intelligence
language:en
Short-container-title:Computational Intelligence

Author:

Lasisi Ramoni O.¹,Allan Vicki H.²

Affiliation:

1. Department of Computer and Information Sciences Virginia Military Institute 24450 VA USA

2. Department of Computer Science Utah State University Logan 84322‐4205 UT USA

Funder

National Science Foundation

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Artificial Intelligence,Computational Mathematics

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/coin.12096

Reference39 articles.

1. Generating Functions for Coalitional Power Indices: An Application to the IMF

2. False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games

3. Aziz H. andM.Paterson.2009.False‐name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting merging and annexation.In 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Budapest Hungary pp.409–416.

4. Aziz H. M.Paterson andD.Leech.2007.Efficient algorithm for designing weighted voting games.In 11th International Multitopic Conference Lahore Parkistan pp.1–6.

5. Bachrach Yoram andEdithElkind.2008.Divide and conquer: False‐name manipulations in weighted voting games.In 7th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Estoril Portugal pp.975–982.

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2. Merging in Weighted Voting Games with Multiple Strategic Agents;Proceedings of the Future Technologies Conference (FTC) 2020, Volume 1;2020-10-31