Modeling bluffing behavior in signaling security games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Modeling bluffing behavior in signaling security games

Published:2020-05-26 Issue:3 Volume:29 Page:1825-1841
ISSN:0969-6016
Container-title:International Transactions in Operational Research
language:en
Short-container-title:Intl. Trans. in Op. Res.

Author:

Chen Ling¹^ORCID,Li Mingchu²,Liu Jia²

Affiliation:

1. School of Mathematical Sciences Dalian University of Technology Dalian 116000 China

2. School of Software Technology Dalian University of Technology Dalian 116000 China

Funder

Nature Science Foundation of China

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Management of Technology and Innovation,Management Science and Operations Research,Strategy and Management,Computer Science Applications,Business and International Management

Link

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/itor.12812

Reference30 articles.

1. An B. Brown M. Vorobeychik Y. Tambe M. 2013. Security games with surveillance cost and optimal timing of attack execution. Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi‐Agent Systems St. Paul MN pp.223–230.

2. Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) Basics and Application Overview

3. A study of general and security Stackelberg game formulations

4. Ceker H. Zhuang J. Upadhyaya S. La Q.D. Soong B. 2016. Deception‐based game theoretical approach to mitigate DoS attacks. Decision and Game Theory for Security 7th International Conference New York pp.18–38.

5. Chicoisne R. Ordóñez F. 2016. Risk averse Stackelberg security games with quantal response. International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security Springer Berlin pp.83–100.

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