Presidential partisanship and regulatory review

Abstract

AbstractIncreasing partisanship is a well‐studied feature of contemporary American politics, but how that partisanship is reflected in executive‐branch administration is relatively under‐examined. This article addresses this question in the context of centralized regulatory review, exploring existing theories of central clearance as a tool of ideological alignment or as a deregulatory mechanism. I first corroborate Haeder and Yackee's finding that ideological misalignment between the president and promulgating agencies does not affect review outcomes. Additionally, while Haeder and Yackee find that more liberal agencies' rules are changed more often, I instead find that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is more likely to request changes under Democratic than under Republican presidents, complicating the possibility of OIRA review as a deregulatory mechanism. These results suggest the need for new theories of the role of regulatory review in the context of the administrative presidency.