Abstract
AbstractOver the past decade, drug consumption has increased in Colombia and Mexico, countries traditionally concerned with drug production and trafficking. Governments and observers have associated this growth with spikes in violence. Drawing on drug consumption surveys and fieldwork in four cities, this study argues that contrary to this perception, there is no automatic connection between domestic drug markets and violence. Violence depends on whether large drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) control low-level street dealers and on whether those DTOs have a market monopoly at the local level. When dealers are independent, violence might be sporadic, but when DTOs control dealers, violence can explode (given competition between DTOs) or implode (if one organization holds a monopoly). Control over dealers provides DTOs not only income but also informants and armed muscle. This article also shows that domestic drug markets are not new, and have grown incrementally in the past two decades.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science,Geography, Planning and Development
Reference72 articles.
1. Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored protection rackets
2. The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not
3. Rios Viridiana . 2012. How Government Structure Encourages Criminal Violence: the Causes of Mexico's Drug War. Ph.D. diss., Department of Government, Harvard University.
Cited by
15 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献