1. 1. See essays 5-8 in myFaces of Intention(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and "Shared Valuing and Frameworks for Practical Reasoning," inReason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, eds. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1-27. (This last essay is reprinted in myStructures of Agency: Essays[New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming].) As in these essays, I continue here to abstract away from complexities introduced by relations of authority and of differential power within the group.
2. 2. So the theoretical issues here parallel those that arise when we ask about an individual agent what makes it true, not only that her hand goes up, but also that she raises her hand intentionally.
3. LAW, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON
4. 4. See myIntention, Plans, and Practical Reason(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987; reissued by CSLI Publications, 1999) andFaces of Intention.
5. 5. Concerning this strategy see in particular "Shared Intention" inFaces of Intention, esp. sec. V.