Only if You Play by the Norms! Insider Norms and Outsider Involvement in Eurogroup and Eurogroup Working Group Interaction During the Sovereign Debt Crisis

Abstract

AbstractReflections on the sovereign debt crisis often portray the Eurogroup and the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG) as inaccessible for euro area outsiders. Yet, common wisdom suggests that Council representatives can circumvent exclusion due to differentiated integration (DI) by complying with insider norms. This article studies whether and how compliance with procedural norms socialised amongst representatives from euro area member states (EAMS) determined patterns of non‐EAMS involvement in Eurogroup and EWG interaction during the sovereign debt crisis. The argument highlights the role of deliberation and consensus‐building norms, suggesting that they gained particular robustness amongst EAMS representatives. Those non‐EAMS representatives who consistently complied with these insider norms could secure involvement in intergovernmental debates amongst EAMS. Exclusion was mostly relevant to norm violators. This article sheds light on the institutional consequences of DI in Economic and Monetary Union, highlighting its structural effects on governance and decision‐making processes during the sovereign debt crisis.