Parasitical elitism in a sectarianized political system with a rentier economy: The power and practice of the Iraqi political elite after 2003

Abstract

AbstractThis article theorizes the role of the elite in a sectarianized political system with a rentier economy. It argues that by virtue of the sectarian and ethnic representation of the sub‐identities, the long‐term interests of society are neglected. The reliance on natural resources creates a competition within the elite to seize the state's revenue for narrow interests. Finally, in such a setting, the elite attempts the monopolization of the flow of information to the public to shore up its legitimacy. The case study is Iraq since it is one of the few, if not the sole, sectarianized political system with a rentier economy. The political elite, despite an abysmal performance for nearly two decades, has been resilient and garnered more power. The continuous malpractice encompasses all the political players who agree on the governing rules by which they maintain their position within the system, and with limited circulation of the elite.Related ArticlesAli, Hamid E., and Shahjahan Bhuiyan. 2022. “Governance, Natural Resources Rent, and Infrastructure Development: Evidence from the Middle East and North Africa.” Politics & Policy 50(2): 408–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12451.Howie, Peter. 2018. “Policy Transfer and Diversification in Resource‐Dependent Economies: Lessons for Kazakhstan from Alberta.” Politics & Policy 46(1): 110–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12239.Khodr, Hiba. 2014. “A Preliminary Comparative Study of Policy Making in Two GCC Countries—Qatar and Kuwait: Processes, Politics, and Participants.” Politics & Policy 42(2): 271–310. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12068.