On two arguments for fanaticism

Abstract

AbstractShould we make significant sacrifices to ever‐so‐slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever‐so‐slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? Fanaticism says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I evaluate the prospects for Fanaticism, in connection with two other kinds of general ethical principles. First, separability principles, which say that which option is best does not depend in strange ways on what might be going on in distant space and time—jumping off from a recent argument for Fanaticism from Beckstead and Thomas (2023). Second, reflection principles, about how gaining new information makes a difference to which options are best—jumping off from a recent argument for Fanaticism from Wilkinson (2022). It turns out that the situation is unstable: plausible general separability and reflection principles actually tell against Fanaticism, but restrictions of those same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) support Fanaticism. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange.