Embedded supervision: China's prosecutorial public interest litigation against government

Abstract

AbstractA commonly held view maintains that diminished autonomy substantially weakens the capacity of legal institutions to challenge state entities, particularly in authoritarian contexts. This study offers an alternative perspective through an empirical analysis of China's recent implementation of prosecutor‐led public interest litigation against state agencies. It suggests that integration within an authoritarian framework might, at least temporarily, enhance the leverage of justice institutions over state entities that violate laws, thereby aiding in navigating the challenges of law enforcement in a restrictive political environment. The research indicates that prosecutors have elicited compliance from the scrutinized agencies by deploying a strategic mix of legal deterrence, informal collaboration, and political threat. This approach is tailored to align with the objectives of local party‐state authorities, thereby securing their support and facilitating governmental compliance. Nonetheless, this political integration concurrently constrains the capacity for such legal initiatives to challenge the discretionary power of upper‐tier or more powerful agencies. These insights reveal the complex interplay between institutional independence and legal enforcement within authoritarian regimes.