License Auctions and Market Structure-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

License Auctions and Market Structure

Published:2006-06 Issue:2 Volume:15 Page:371-396
ISSN:1058-6407
Container-title:Journal of Economics Management Strategy
language:en
Short-container-title:J Economics Management Strategy

Author:

Hoppe Heidrun C.,Jehiel Philippe,Moldovanu Benny

Publisher

Wiley

Subject

Management of Technology and Innovation,Strategy and Management,Economics and Econometrics,General Business, Management and Accounting,General Medicine

Link

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00104.x/fullpdf

Reference47 articles.

1. Coordination in Split Award Auctions

2. L. Ausubel, and P. Cramton , 2002 , "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions ," Working Paper, University of Maryland.

3. L. Ausubel, and J. Schwartz , 1999 , "The Ascending Auction Paradox ," Discussion Paper, University of Maryland.

4. REGULATION BY DUOPOLY

Cited by 47 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. When can auctions maximize post-auction welfare?;International Journal of Industrial Organization;2023-07

2. Licensing policy and platform models of telemedicine: A multi-case study from China;Frontiers in Public Health;2023-02-02

3. Patent auctions and bidding coalitions: structuring the sale of club goods;The RAND Journal of Economics;2021-08-05

4. Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions: Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity;The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics;2021-03-11

5. Entry Deterrence and Free Riding in License Auctions: Incumbent Heterogeneity and Monotonicity;SSRN Electronic Journal;2021