1. 38. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Art.17.6 (stating (i) that if national authorities' “establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the [WTO dispute resolution] panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned”, and (ii) that “[w]here the panel finds that a relevant provision of the [antidumping] Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement even if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations”). To the extent that panels and the Appellate Body are willing to concede the possibility of multiple, permissible inferences from facts and treaty text, instead of imposing their preferred interpretations in formalistic fashion, Art. 17.6 gives member states discretion to take antidumping measures. Daniel Tarullo points to the parallel between Art. 17.6 and U.S. administrative agencies' discretion, under Chevron, USA v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984), to adopt any “permissible construction” of an ambiguous statute. Tarullo, Daniel K. , The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions 5–6 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author, DKT).
2. 94. Id.
3. 55. European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), AB Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (February 13, 1998).
4. 91. Doha Declaration, supra note 87, para. 5(c).