Coordination schemes for resource reallocation and patient transfer in hospital alliance models

Author:

Li Zhong‐Ping1,Chang Jasmine2ORCID,Shi Jim2ORCID,Wang Jian‐Jun3ORCID

Affiliation:

1. School of Business Anhui University Hefei China

2. Tuchman School of Management New Jersey Institute of Technology Newark New Jersey USA

3. School of Economics and Management Dalian University of Technology Dalian China

Abstract

AbstractIn many countries, healthcare systems encounter the issue of imbalance between supply and demand in a hierarchical structure. The comprehensive hospitals, which possess more high‐quality resources, are often overwhelmed, while their counterparts, community hospitals, are often idle. To address this imbalance issue, certain payment schemes are generally considered effective in motivating comprehensive hospitals to divert patients downstream via resource transfer. In addition to two particular payment schemes, namely, patient payment (PP) and fee‐for‐capacity (FFC), this study also considers two hospital alliance models, the government‐led (GL‐type) and the hospital‐forged (HF‐type) alliance, for effectively overcoming the imbalance issue. Compared to the HF‐type alliance, in which each community hospital determines the price paid to the comprehensive hospital for transferring resources, the GL‐type alliance requires the payment price to be set by the regulator. Methodologically, this study devises a three‐stage sequential game to characterize the dynamics among the various entities, such as the regulator, the comprehensive hospital, the community hospitals, and the patients. Equilibrium results, in terms of the capacity sinking rate and patient transfer rate, are derived, and scheme and alliance performances are evaluated using various measurements, such as patient utility, and hospital and social welfare. We find that a direct payment scheme (FFC) under a centralized alliance model (GL‐type alliance) is more effective for both making decisions (about the patient transfer rate, capacity sinking rate, and payment price) and the performances (of each hospital's welfare, patient welfare, the waiting time per patient, and social welfare). Furthermore, our study examines the impacts of the alliance scale and finds that social welfare is first decreasing and then increasing with alliance scale. Therefore, it is suggested to establish either a one‐to‐one hospital alliance (consisting of a comprehensive and a community hospital) or a large‐scale (e.g., a comprehensive and 10 community hospitals) hospital alliance.

Funder

Agricultural Marketing Service

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Publisher

Wiley

Cited by 2 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3