Pillar 2: tax competition in low‐income countries and substance‐based income exclusion

Abstract

AbstractPillar 2 of the OECD's global tax reform proposal will have significant direct and indirect impacts for low‐income developing countries (LICs). Most interesting and problematic is the question as to how the global anti‐base erosion (GloBE) rules for a proposed global minimum effective tax will affect tax competition behaviour in LICs, and how LICs should respond when a critical mass of higher‐income economies adopt the new structure. Most LICs are source‐only countries, and they are very much in competition to attract foreign direct investment. Do LICs want to continue to compete using the tax system to the extent possible, to step back from that competition, or to take some intermediate course? Pillar 2 does not itself change a country's desired position on the competition spectrum – it merely affects how, and to what extent, that position can still be obtained. This paper posits that LICs should adopt qualified domestic minimum top‐up taxes, and that this will not itself have a negative impact on their competitiveness. The primary focus of the paper, however, is on the design of the substance‐based income exclusion (carve‐out), examining the following three questions. Should the GloBE have been designed without a carve‐out? Would there have been a better way of designing it? How will LICs be affected? The paper concludes that, as little real advantage is likely to accrue to LICs from intangible assets, minimising tax competition for those assets will have relatively little impact on them; and that, from an economic efficiency standpoint, shifting the tax burden away from a normal return and toward economic rents – albeit imperfectly – is a reasonable solution.