Author:
Binkley Clark S,Zhang Daowei
Abstract
On 14 April 1994, the British Columbia government announced a new stumpage formula that, at then-expected product prices, increased the average charge by about $12/m3 and more than doubled the rate at which stumpage fees change when lumber prices change. Most of the increased revenues are reinvested in the forest sector by a new organization, Forest Renewal British Columbia (FRBC), created specifically for that purpose. Using standard event-study methodologies, this paper documents the net effect of the fee increases and new policy direction on British Columbia forest products companies. After controlling for firm-specific risk and the decline in the Toronto Stock Exchange that occurred at about the same time, the new stumpage policy extracted about $1.0 billion from shareholders of the firms studied, and perhaps $2.4 billion from all licencees (an amount roughly equal to the capitalized after-tax cost of the higher fees). The impact on individual firms is highly correlated with the allowable annual cut (AAC) in replaceable licenses each holds, with an average impact of about $33.3/m3 of AAC. The market appears to have discounted both the good news about offsets in impending timber-supply reductions that the creation of FRBC implies and the reductions in earnings risk that the new stumpage system provides. When added to the increased regulatory costs associated with the new provincial Forest Practice Code, the timber-fee increases appear to have fully depleted the value of holding British Columbia timber quotas.
Publisher
Canadian Science Publishing
Subject
Ecology,Forestry,Global and Planetary Change
Cited by
4 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献