HYBRID WAR: RUSSIAN DOCTRINE AND LESSONS FROM RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

Abstract

The article is devoted to the consideration of the concept of "hybrid war", which is widespread in recent years, and currently has different interpretations. The characteristics of the phenomenon of hybrid warfare, which are operated by research, expert and leading military centers of the Russian Federation, which influence the decision-making or directly participate in them, are highlighted. It also presents conclusions that follow from the observation of Russian activities in Еastern Ukraine and points to the potential risks arising from such activities in the future. The article presents the most popular definitions of the phenomenon of hybrid war, appearing in Polish and American literature. It also takes into account the studies of Ukrainian authors dealing with this subject: in this case, directly related to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine that has been ongoing since 2014. In this context, the definitions of the concept of hybrid war described in the text in terms of the official military institutions of the Russian Federation: the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, are also of particular importance. This approach, present in Russian definitions and approach, had a practical dimension in connection with the Russian armed aggression in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, from 2014 until now. It describes the full set of actions and measures that the Russian Federation uses as part of hybrid operations and which (what can be assumed with high probability) will continue to be used in the future in relation to Ukraine and other countries that are or will be objects of Russian aggressive policy and actions. This problem is significant not only for Ukraine, but also for other countries in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, especially the so-called "NATO's eastern flank".