Replies to Maiese and Mendonça

Abstract

I begin with my replies to Michelle Maiese, especially with respect to the hard problem of consciousness, my version of reductive-realism, my version of a type-identity theory, my version of an embodied cognitive theory, and questions regarding exactly what an enactive or embodied theory entails. I also address Dina Mendonça’s concerns about cultural diversity in the study of emotion, in the section on reductive realism, type-identity theory, and objectivity in the science of emotion. I then move on to addressing the concerns raised by Mendonça on meta-emotions, reflexivity, and the third kind of language of emotion (a meta-language). In summary, I hope these replies give the reader a better idea of meta-semantic pluralisme, semantic dualism, semantic dualisme, including the various ways in which they might contribute to the discourse on the mind, emotion, and meta-emotions, as well as some inspiration for their own research and future publications.