1. See Shavell, S., 1987. Economic analysis of accident law, 108; a similar point is made by Trebilcock, M.J., 1987. The social insurance – deterrence dilemma of modern North American tort law: a Canadian perspective on the liability insurance crisis. San Diego Law Review (24), 929–1002.
2. See on this topic also the many publications of Akkermans and more particularly his dissertation A. Akkermans, 1997. Proportionele aansprakelijkheid bij onzeker causal verband.
3. For an overview of how several European countries, as well as Israel, the United States, and South Africa deal with proportional liability, see Gilead, I., Green, M.D., Koch, B.A. (Eds.), 2013. Proportional Liability: Analytical and Comparative Perspectives. De Gruyter, Berlin.
4. For a discussion of alternative causation under German law, see Köndgen, J., 1991. Multiple causation and joint tortfeasors pollution cases according to German law. In: van Dunné, J.M. (Ed.), Transboundary Pollution and Liability, the Case of the River Rhine, pp. 99–106, and the interesting article of Bodewig, Th., 1985. Probleme alternativer Kausalität bei Massenschäden. Archiv für die civilistische Praxis (AcP), 505–558.
5. Note, however, that the Dutch Supreme Court only considered the causation question. Formally, it still has to be decided whether bringing DES on the market was in itself wrongful. See Hoge Raad October 9, 1992, 1994 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ), 535 (C.J.H.B.). See on this case, Spier, J., Wansink, J.H., 1993. Joint and Several Liability of DES Manufacturers: A Dutch Tort Crisis. International Insurance Law Review (IILR), 176–181.