Value of public information in sender–receiver games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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Value of public information in sender–receiver games

Published:2012-03 Issue:3 Volume:114 Page:343-345
ISSN:0165-1765
Container-title:Economics Letters
language:en
Short-container-title:Economics Letters

Author:

Chen Ying

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Finance

Reference11 articles.

1. Chen, Y., 2011. Value of public information in sender–receiver games. Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926438.

2. Strategic information transmission;Crawford;Econometrica,1982

3. A two-person game of information transmission;Green;Journal of Economic Theory,2007

4. Allocation of decision-making authority;Harris;Review of Finance,2005

5. Ishida, J., Shimizu, T., 2010. Cheap talk with an informed receiver. Working Paper.

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1. Designing Interrogations;Review of Economic Studies;2024-05-24

2. Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification;Theoretical Economics;2024

3. Blind Disclosure;American Economic Journal: Microeconomics;2023-05-01

4. Reputation and information aggregation;Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization;2023-04

5. Cheap Talk and Lie Detection;SSRN Electronic Journal;2022

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