Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation

Published:2010-09 Issue:5 Volume:46 Page:775-785
ISSN:0304-4068
Container-title:Journal of Mathematical Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Mathematical Economics

Author:

Serrano Roberto,Vohra Rajiv

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Applied Mathematics,Economics and Econometrics

Reference23 articles.

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4. Artemov, G., Kunimoto, T., Serrano, R., 2007. Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine, Economics Working Paper 2007–06, Brown University.

5. Nash implementation without no-veto power;Benoit;Games and Economic Behavior,2008

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