On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games

Published:2011-12 Issue:6 Volume:47 Page:683-688
ISSN:0304-4068
Container-title:Journal of Mathematical Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Mathematical Economics

Author:

Oyama Daisuke,Takahashi Satoru

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Applied Mathematics,Economics and Econometrics

Reference19 articles.

1. Basteck, C., Daniëls, T.R., Heinemann, F., 2010. Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2010-008, Humboldt University.

2. Basteck, C., Daniëls, T.R., 2010. Every symmetric 3×3 global game of strategic complementarities is noise independent. SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2010-061, Humboldt University.

3. Global games and equilibrium selection;Carlsson;Econometrica,1993

4. Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities;Frankel;Journal of Economic Theory,2003

5. Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection;Galesloot;Journal of Mathematical Economics,1997

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