Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: A symmetric example-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: A symmetric example

Published:2011-12 Issue:6 Volume:47 Page:663-669
ISSN:0304-4068
Container-title:Journal of Mathematical Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Mathematical Economics

Author:

Honda Jun

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Applied Mathematics,Economics and Econometrics

Reference27 articles.

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2. Basteck, C., Daniëls, T.R., Heinemann, F., 2010. Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. SFB 649 Discussion Papers. Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.

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