The effect of incumbent bidding in set-aside auctions: An analysis of prices in the closed and open segments of FCC Auction 35-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The effect of incumbent bidding in set-aside auctions: An analysis of prices in the closed and open segments of FCC Auction 35

Published:2008-04 Issue:3-4 Volume:32 Page:273-290
ISSN:0308-5961
Container-title:Telecommunications Policy
language:en
Short-container-title:Telecommunications Policy

Author:

Cramton Peter,Ingraham Allan T.,Singer Hal J.

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Information Systems,Communication,Library and Information Sciences,Economics and Econometrics,Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Management Information Systems

Reference27 articles.

1. Deficit reduction through diversity;Ayres;Stanford Law Review,1996

2. Bajari, P., & Fox, J. T. (2005). Complementarities and Collusion in an FCC Spectrum Auction. NBER working paper 11671.

3. The FCC spectrum auctions: An early assessment;Cramton;Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,1997

4. Csirik, J. A. (2002). Do auction discounts reduce revenues? Evidence from the FCC's Auction no. 35,AT&T Labs—Research.

5. FCC Public Notice (October 5, 2000). Minimum opening bids, upfront payments and other procedural issues for final auction inventory report no. AUC-00-35-E at § II.C.1 (released October 5, 2000).

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