On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring

Published:1999-10 Issue:1 Volume:60 Page:79-104
ISSN:0304-3878
Container-title:Journal of Development Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Development Economics

Author:

Armendáriz de Aghion Beatriz

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Development

Reference19 articles.

1. Imperfect information, screening, and the costs of informal lending: a study of a rural credit market in Pakistan;Aleem;World Bank Economic Review,1990

2. Armendariz de Aghion, B., 1995. On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring. STICERD Working Paper No. 55, The London School of Economics, July.

3. Thy neighbor's keeper: the design of a credit cooperative with theory and test;Banerjee;Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994

4. Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral;Besley;Journal of Development Economics,1995

5. A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting;Bolton;American Economic Review,1990

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