An economic analysis of plea bargaining: the incentives of the parties in a mixed penal system-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

An economic analysis of plea bargaining: the incentives of the parties in a mixed penal system

Published:2001-06 Issue:2 Volume:21 Page:213-231
ISSN:0144-8188
Container-title:International Review of Law and Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:International Review of Law and Economics

Author:

Boari Nicola,Fiorentini Gianluca

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Law,Economics and Econometrics,Finance

Reference35 articles.

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