A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets

Published:2019-03 Issue: Volume:98 Page:10-14
ISSN:0165-4896
Container-title:Mathematical Social Sciences
language:en
Short-container-title:Mathematical Social Sciences

Author:

Atay Ata,Núñez Marina

Funder

Hungarian National Research, Development and Innovation Office

Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) y Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER)

Generalitat de Catalunya

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,General Psychology,General Social Sciences,Sociology and Political Science

Reference14 articles.

1. Atay, A., Núñez, M., Core stability and core-like solutions for three-sided assignment games, IEHAS Discussion Papers 1806, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. https://www.mtakti.hu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/MTDP1806.pdf.

2. On the solution of w-stable sets;Han;Math. Social Sci.,2016

3. Cores of partitioning games;Kaneko;Math. Social Sci.,1982

4. A game with no solution;Lucas;Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.,1968

5. von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets;Lucas,1992

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