Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction

Published:2020-03 Issue:2 Volume:48 Page:176-179
ISSN:0167-6377
Container-title:Operations Research Letters
language:en
Short-container-title:Operations Research Letters

Author:

Ma Will,Sivan Balasubramanian

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Applied Mathematics,Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering,Management Science and Operations Research,Software

Reference12 articles.

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2. S. Chawla, J.D. Hartline, R.D. Kleinberg, Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations, in: Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), San Diego, California, USA, June 11–15, 2007, 2007, pp. 243–251.

3. Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing;Chawla,2010

4. Posted price mechanisms for a random stream of customers;Correa,2017

5. E. Elkind, Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions, in: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2007, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, January 7–9, 2007, 2007, pp. 736–745.

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