The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions

Published:2006-09 Issue:5 Volume:34 Page:491-498
ISSN:0167-6377
Container-title:Operations Research Letters
language:en
Short-container-title:Operations Research Letters

Author:

Grigorieva Elena,Jean-Jacques Herings P.,Müller Rudolf,Vermeulen Dries

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Applied Mathematics,Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering,Management Science and Operations Research,Software

Reference10 articles.

1. Multipart pricing of public goods;Clarke;Public Choice,1971

2. Protecting the winner: second-price versus oral auctions;Engelbrecht-Wiggans;Econ. Lett.,1991

3. Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods;Green;Econometrica,1977

4. E. Grigorieva, P.J.-J. Herings, R. Müller, D. Vermeulen, The private value single item bisection auction. Research Memoranda, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization, RM/02/035, 2002, to appear in Economic Theory.

5. Incentives in teams;Groves;Econometrica,1973

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