Institutional endowment as foundation for regulatory performance and regime transitions: the role of the US constitution in telecommunications regulation in the United States-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Institutional endowment as foundation for regulatory performance and regime transitions: the role of the US constitution in telecommunications regulation in the United States

Published:1999-10 Issue:9 Volume:23 Page:607-623
ISSN:0308-5961
Container-title:Telecommunications Policy
language:en
Short-container-title:Telecommunications Policy

Author:

Cherry Barbara A,Wildman Steve S

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Information Systems,Communication,Library and Information Sciences,Economics and Econometrics,Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Management Information Systems

Reference31 articles.

1. Armstrong v. United States. (1960) 364 U.S. 40.

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3. Unilateral and bilateral rules;Cherry,1999

4. Cherry, B., Wildman, S. (1998). Long-term commitments, breach, and compensation for stranded costs in transition policy. Working paper, Northwestern University.

5. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. U.S. (1993/1995). 830 F. Supp. 909 (E. Dist. Va. 1993), affirmed (CA-92-1751-A) (4th Cir. 1995).

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