Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions

Published:2006-09 Issue:1 Volume:134 Page:69-94
ISSN:0304-4076
Container-title:Journal of Econometrics
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Econometrics

Author:

Brendstrup Bjarne,Paarsch Harry J.

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Applied Mathematics,Economics and Econometrics

Reference31 articles.

1. How auctions work for wine and art;Ashenfelter;Journal of Economic Perspectives,1989

2. Identification of standard auction models;Athey;Econometrica,2002

3. Austin, A., Katzman, B., 2002. Testing a model of multi-unit bidder demands using tobacco auction data. Typescript, Department of Economics, University of Miami.

4. Bajari, P., 1997. The first price auction with asymmetric bidders: theory and applications. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.

5. Comparing competition and collusion in procurement auctions: a numerical approach;Bajari;Economic Theory,2001

Cited by 28 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Starting high or low in English auctions? The case of frozen saithe in Norway;Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association;2024-06-11

2. Quality Uncertainty and Repeat Purchases in Fish Auctions: Are Price Affected?;European Review of Agricultural Economics;2024-05-15

3. Identification and estimation of sequential games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria;Journal of Econometrics;2024-01

4. Identification of interdependent values in sequential first-price auctions;International Journal of Industrial Organization;2023-12

5. Identification in english auctions with shill bidding;Quantitative Marketing and Economics;2023-11-23