Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto

Published:2003-12 Issue:12 Volume:87 Page:2677-2701
ISSN:0047-2727
Container-title:Journal of Public Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Public Economics

Author:

de Figueiredo Rui J.P

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Finance

Reference39 articles.

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5. Blossfeld, H.-P., Hamerle, A., Mayer, K.U., 1989. Event History Analysis: Statistical Theory and Application in the Social Sciences. Hillsdale, L. Erlbaum Associates, NJ.

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