Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, and crime as an agency cost-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, and crime as an agency cost

Published:1999-03 Issue:1 Volume:5 Page:1-34
ISSN:0929-1199
Container-title:Journal of Corporate Finance
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Corporate Finance

Author:

Alexander Cindy R.,Cohen Mark A.

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Strategy and Management,Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Business and International Management

Reference55 articles.

1. Production, information costs and economic organization;Alchian;American Economic Review,1972

2. Alexander, C.R., Cohen, M.A., 1996. Why do corporations become criminals? An agency explanation. EAG Working Paper, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

3. The potentially perverse effects of corporate criminal liability;Arlen;Journal of Legal Studies,1994

4. Baghat, S., Black, B., 1998. Board independence and long-term firm performance. Mime.

5. Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition;Baysinger;Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1985

Cited by 85 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Does Bank Monitoring Reduce Corporate Misreporting? Evidence from Foreign Bank Entry in China;Management Science;2024-09-03

2. The bright side of controlling owners in emerging markets: the case of corporate fraud;Applied Economics;2024-08-28

3. Game theory, compliance, and corporate criminal liability: Insights from a three-player inspection game;Decision Analytics Journal;2024-06

4. Internal governance mechanisms and corporate misconduct;International Review of Financial Analysis;2024-03

5. Exploring the linkages between firm misconduct and entrepreneurial growth in China;Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development;2023-07-27