Author:
Harstad Ronald M.,Kagel John H.,Levin Dan
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Finance
Reference10 articles.
1. Proofs for optimal auction design when the number of bidders is uncertain;Harstad,1987
2. Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions;Levin;Economics Letters,1986
3. Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders;McAfee;Journal of Economic Theory,1987
4. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers;Maskin;Econometrica,1984
5. Information acquisition in competitive bidding processes;Matthews,1977
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