Patent Hold-up and Royalty Stacking: The Case of Multiple Downstream Firms-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Patent Hold-up and Royalty Stacking: The Case of Multiple Downstream Firms

Published:2015 Issue: Volume:24 Page:306-312
ISSN:2212-5671
Container-title:Procedia Economics and Finance
language:en
Short-container-title:Procedia Economics and Finance

Author:

Karbowski Adam,Prokop Jacek

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Reference20 articles.

1. Boldrin M, Levine D. The Case against Patents. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2013; 27: 3-22.

2. Elhauge E. Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematic Excessive Royalties?. Journal of Competition Law and Economics. 2008; 4: 535-570.

3. Galetovic A, Haber S, Levine R. Patent Holdup: Do Patent Holders Holdup Innovation?. Hoover Institution Working Group on Intellectual. Property, Innovation, and Prosperity. Stanford University. working paper no. 14011; 2014.

4. Geradin D, Rato M. Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitive Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty Stacking and the. Meaning of FRAND. SSRN. working paper; 2006.

5. Geradin D. What is wrong with royalties in high technology industries?. Stockholm Network Experts’ Series on Intellectual Property and. Competition; 2007.

Cited by 2 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. A Study on Royalty Calculation to Correct Royalty Stacking and Holdup/Holdout of Standard Essential Patent;2019 IEEE VTS Asia Pacific Wireless Communications Symposium (APWCS);2019-08

2. The Impact of Vertical R&D Cooperation on Market Performance of Firms;Entrepreneurial Business and Economics Review;2019