A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games

Published:1989-02 Issue:1 Volume:47 Page:51-65
ISSN:0022-0531
Container-title:Journal of Economic Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Economic Theory

Author:

Bergin James

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Reference5 articles.

1. D. Abreu, D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti, “Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 791, Yale University.

2. Nonzero sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information;Hart;Math. Oper. Res.,1985

3. Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy;Hildenbrand,1974

4. Sequential equilibria;Kreps;Econometrica,1982

5. Optimal behavioral strategies in zero-sum games with almost perfect information;Ponssard;Math. Oper. Res.,1982

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1. Approximation of Isomorphic Infinite Two-Person Non-Cooperative Games by Variously Sampling the Players’ Payoff Functions and Reshaping Payoff Matrices into Bimatrix Game;Applied Computer Systems;2016-12-01

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