Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma

Published:2008-07 Issue:3 Volume:11 Page:515-528
ISSN:1094-2025
Container-title:Review of Economic Dynamics
language:en
Short-container-title:Review of Economic Dynamics

Author:

Bhaskar V.,Mailath George J.,Morris Stephen

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Reference14 articles.

1. Informational constraints and the overlapping generations model: Folk and anti-folk theorems;Bhaskar;Review of Economic Studies,1998

2. The Robustness of Repeated Game Equilibria to Incomplete Payoff Information;Bhaskar,2000

3. Bhaskar, V., Mailath, G.J., Morris, S., 2004. Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma, PIER Working Paper 04-004, Uiversity of Pennsylvania

4. Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring;Bhaskar;Journal of Economic Theory,2002

5. Moral hazard and private monitoring;Bhaskar;Journal of Economic Theory,2002

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