On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

Published:2020-03 Issue: Volume:186 Page:104992
ISSN:0022-0531
Container-title:Journal of Economic Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Economic Theory

Author:

Arribillaga R. Pablo,Massó Jordi,Neme Alejandro

Funder

UNSL

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas

Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica

Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness

Generalitat de Catalunya

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Reference21 articles.

1. Arribillaga, R.P., Massó, J., Neme, A., 2019. All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof. Barcelona GSE W.P. 1108 and UFAE-IAE W.P. 966.19.

2. Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof;Ashlagi;J. Econ. Theory,2018

3. Experiments with the pivotal process for providing public goods;Attiyeh;Public Choice,2000

4. Bade, S., Gonczarowski, Y., 2017. Gibbard-Satterthwaite success stories and obviously strategyproofness. Mimeo.

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