Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains

Published:2013-05 Issue:3 Volume:148 Page:1074-1101
ISSN:0022-0531
Container-title:Journal of Economic Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Economic Theory

Author:

Carbajal Juan Carlos,McLennan Andrew,Tourky Rabee

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Reference43 articles.

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5. André Berger, Rudolf Müller, Seyed Hossein Naeemi, Path-monotonicity and truthful implementation, Technical report, Maastricht University, 2010.

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