1. Dieter HenrichFichtes Ursprüngliche Einsicht1967 7 reprintedKantstudienvol. 66 1975 395 et seq.
2. Henrich, Dieter. 1967.Fichtes Ursprüngliche Einsicht10–15. See Frankfurt
3. Ibid., pp. 10–11. In the light of Rousseau's discussion of the origins and transformation of human consciousness in hisDiscours sur l'inégalité, Henrich's characterisation of Rousseau as a proponent of a reflective model of self-consciousness seems extremely questionable. Rather, Rousseau, together with Herder, must be regarded as one of the principal and earliest proponents of the view of the social and historical conditionedness of all consciousness. Unlike Herder, however, Rousseau does not seem to appreciate fully the importance of language in the inter-subjective process constituting the self
4. See HenrichFichtes Ursprüngliche Einsicht1967 14et seq.For a detailed discussion of Henrich's claim, see R.B. PippinHegel's Idealism—The Satisfactions of Self-consciousness1989 46 59 Cambridge
5. SeeKritik der reinen VernunftB131–133.