Emerging Multilateral Cooperation and Reshaping Alliances in East Asia since the Late 1960s

Abstract

Since the late 1960s, the East Asian allies of the United States (U.S.) have prioritized security strategies based on the principles of “self-reliance” or “self-help.” Although the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea), which was threatened by conventional arms from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), the context of “self-reliance” basically implies that nations are responsible for their own security requirements unless they are confronted with a potential nuclear threat. This was triggered by the Nixon shock of 1969, which resulted in a reduction of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea; however, nuclear weapons continued to be deployed. These U.S. troop reductions also occurred in Japan, but the changes in U.S. troop deployment differed. Several years after the Nixon administration, the U.S. government removed all troops and nuclear weapons from the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan). These adjustments were part of Nixon’s broader aim of global détente, leading to enhanced relations between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (China). Under these circumstances, each country pursued its national interests in different ways while striving for “self-reliance,” which sometimes included the development of its own nuclear weapons programs. Additionally, South Korea attempted to establish a framework for multilateral cooperation but was unsuccessful in achieving a multilateral security agreement. This chapter explores the transformation of bilateral alliances and multilateral cooperation in response to changes in the regional security environment. It utilizes previous studies and documents on the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) and links them to the following examination of the historicity of multilateralism in East Asia.