Abstract
This article examines the non-issue of bank clearinghouse certificates during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Instead of a market failure, this non-issue is found to have been the result of an intervention. At the time, the issue of clearinghouse certificates to temporarily meet the need of the economy for a medium of exchange following a financial panic was a well-established practice. To make a long story short: In 1933, plans were underway by bankers to resort to this expedient. Merchants and the public at large were anxious to get their hands on the money substitute. But federal authorities said no. Instead of a short-term fix, following which the economy would return to its former ways, federal authorities had other plans. This paper examines both the specifics of the issue of emergency money during the Great Depression and the general principles involved in such issues.
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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