Affiliation:
1. Novosibirsk State University; Institute of Philosophy and Law, SB RAS
Abstract
The paper aims to answer the question: «How does an electron exist at the beginning of the 21st century?» from the point of view of the general logic of the philosophy of science discourse, taking into account contemporary philosophical concepts that explain what an «electron» is, and in what sense we could talk about the «existence» of such objects in the first quarter of the 21st century. A good concept of the existence of an object postulated by a successful scientific theory should at least take into account two contexts of proper philosophical reasoning – reasoning «from science», grasping the questions of the philosophical and methodological justification of knowledge at the level of certain «standards of rationality» that correspond to the chosen theory, and reasoning «from metaphysics», which, in the appropriate context, interpret «electron» as an element of objective reality, as if the electron of scientists «actually» existed. Our thesis is that by choosing as the main elements of the concept the Dennettian ontology of patterns project and the E.J. Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian categorical ontology project, we will be able to block the problem of pessimistic meta-induction (H. Putnam, L. Laudan, etc.). The electron exists as a pattern that we extract from the whole set of empirical data associated with the theoretical entity «electron», whose «real definition» right now is given by the Standard Model and the accompanying concepts from quantum mechanics. In the course of the scientific revolution, the electron, as a pattern, does not disappear anywhere, since parts of the «real definitions» of the patterns of the old «paradigm», those that can be retrospectively interpreted and functionally meaningfully coupled with the new one, will be asserted within the «real definitions» of the new patterns, which indicates on the existence of a relationship of «essential dependence» between the «old» and the «new» patterns.
Publisher
Novosibirsk State University (NSU)
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