Abstract
Forgiveness is often distinguished from other ways of eliminating (or reducing) blame, such as letting go. In this paper, I focus on a conception of forgiveness as normative landscape change (alteration of the rights and obligations of relevant parties), and explore the distinction between forgiveness—understood in this way—and letting go. I highlight the explanatory power of this approach for distinguishing forgiveness and letting go, and contrast it with an alternative way, in which the focus is instead primarily on a kind of attitude change. I conclude by comparing the implications of both forgiveness and letting go for other phenomena we care about, such as reconciliation.
Subject
General Social Sciences,Sociology and Political Science,Cultural Studies,Gender Studies,Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),History
Cited by
1 articles.
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