HOW EFFECTIVE MECHANISM IS THE CONVENTION ONTHEPROHIBITIONOFNUCLEARWEAPONSON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (TPNW)TODETERNUCLEARESCALATION?(TPNW) TO DETER NUCLEAR ESCALATION

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of the Convention on the ProhibiƟ on of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) toward deterring nuclear escalaƟ on, which entered into force in 2021 and prohibits the creaƟ on, posses-sion, proliferaƟ on and use of nuclear weapons while also responding to a number of demands related to denucle-arizaƟ on. For the in-depth analysis of the theme, the regimes theory in InternaƟ onal RelaƟ ons and the criteria of the theoreƟ cal explanaƟ on of the regime eff ecƟ veness are selected. The paper is built around the basic premise that the ConvenƟ on is ineff ecƟ ve in achieving its intended goals and discusses three main arguments: (a) norma-Ɵ ve incoherence, (b) lack of insƟ tuƟ onal mechanisms, and (c) neglect of the global security and strategic context. To prove the laƩ er, the paper analyzes the Russian war against Ukraine and the importance of nuclear deterrence in the background of the nuclear warnings coming from Russia. Despite the reasons listed above, the main draw-back of the ConvenƟ on is the refusal of the nuclear-weapon states to raƟ fy the agreement. On the one hand, the anarchic international system creates a solid basis for mistrust and asymmetric gains between states, and on the other hand, the ConvenƟ on does not off er them security guarantees. Accordingly, the ConvenƟ on represents an idealisƟ c view of internaƟ onal organizaƟ ons and civil society.