Author:
Xu Yangjie,Shi Chengdong,Yu Weitong,Feng Changzhe,Zhang Zhiyao
Abstract
Under the influence of market demand fluctuation, the difference in the quality of the source of goods of risk-averse retailers leads to the problem of profit damage between the two parties of empowerment co-operation. Based on this, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model for the brand empowerment supply chain of fresh food e-commerce platform with vertical channel conflict. From the supply chain perspective, we explore the impact of brand empowerment level, risk sharing coefficient, order quantity of different channels and other factors on the decision-making of the two co-operating parties under different empowerment contracts. The study finds that (1) fresh food e-commerce companies can reduce the damage of other channels' products to the platform's brand value through risk-sharing strategies. (2) Differentiated empowerment pacts for different types of retailers can effectively mitigate channel conflicts and increase fresh food e-commerce companies' profits.