The development of the modern Chinese concept of conventional deterrence

Abstract

Deterrence strategy has always been an interesting topic for many international relations scholars. The concept was the hallmark of the USSoviet politics during the Cold War and rightly became an important aspect of other countries' politics, as well. The Chinese idea of deterrence is somewhat unique compared to the "standard" model of deterrence, which is often seen in the Western literature. In the Chinese case deterring the enemy from attacking you is a part of the strategy, while the other part can be focused on accomplishing political goals using coercive approaches. In other words, deterrence can be used as an offensive-active strategy, in Schelling terms, that strives for compellence among adversaries. In the following paper we shall analyze the Chinese idea of deterrence and how it was developed with other strategic approaches in the past three decades. The PLA strategies such as winning local wars based on information, assassin's mace and anti-access/area denial to a larger extent are intertwined with the idea of deterrence. Our goal is to explain these strategies and how they correlate with deterrence, as well as to point out some potential problems or misperceptions that can occur due to the ambiguous character of the Chinese deterrence and regional interests. This, in essence, represents the crux of the problem. The changes in the Chinese politics that have been ongoing in the last ten years influence the perceptions of its intentions among other regional actors and the Chinese idea of detterrence. If we consider the Chinese detterrence in broader theoretical framework that implies compellence as well, we can easily understand that growing concern among regional actors is not unfounded. Growing geopolitical ambitions among the Chinese policymakers are a reflection of the state's growing military capabilities. In recent policy papers we could see that the Chinese regional interests imply some kind of a change in the regional balance of power that could, over time, reflect on the global balance of power, as well. In such geopolitical environment the primary goals of deterrence could be put in question, in terms of whether the strategy is deterring a rival or trying to compel him in order to gain political concessions. During the last ten years the Chinese Armed Forces have been transformed from a strong land power to a growing sea power, whose capabilites imply the development of the blue-water Navy that can contest other regional powers, primarly the US. Such military developments inevitably change the perception of threat among regional actors, as well as their perception of the Chinese concept of deterrence.