"Inculpable Ignorance" in war: Collateral damage and supreme emergency

Abstract

In this paper, author aims to determine the existence of the possibility of the inculpable ignorance argument even for acts of combatants in war, in specific contexts of collateral damage and supreme emergency. The argument of inculpable ignorance is extremely important in Just War Theory and international law as an argument which justifies participation of individuals in war, regardless of its moral and legal status. However, by analyzing the very argument of inculpable ignorance as well as the phenomena of collateral damage and supreme emergency in war, author demonstrates that inculpable ignorance can potentially exist in war itself, i.e., during acts done out of such ignorance in war. Process of utilitarian calculus of justness of collateral damage and the process of deliberation of fulfilment of conditions that constitute the situation of supreme emergence are out of combatants' reach, while their knowledge of correctness of decisions and orders derived from these processes is practically impossible. Accordingly, in these particular situations the argument of inculpable ignorance can be valid for acts which violate norms and rules of war, because the truth about the moral-legal status of these acts remains unknowable for combatants.