Abstract
The application of the concept of asymmetry in the domain of security enables a comprehensive overview of the strategic relations between the opposing parties, as well as the methods used by the adversaries in an effort to turn this type of inequality into a permanent strategic advantage. As a process, asymmetry can most often be reduced to the creation or exploitation of power inequality between adversaries, with the ultimate goal of generating strategic or political asymmetry. By skilfully exploiting the political and security asymmetry that arose after the NATO aggression in 1999, Pristina and its allies constantly constantly built statehood of the so-called "Republic of Kosovo". At the same time, they undertook various political, security and economic activities in order to reduce the effectiveness of the instruments of power of the Republic of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija and neutralize Serbia's influence in the southern Serbian province. In addition to building institutions and developing various instruments of power, the Albanian political elite in Kosovo and Metohija worked intensively on building internal and external legitimacy. The key results of such activities of Pristina certainly represent: the extortion of the international community foreign policy attitude on the irreversibility of Kosovo's independence, the support of the USA, the EU and NATO members to the self-proclaimed independence, the relocation of Belgrade-Pristina negotiations outside the UN and the mediation of the European Union, the pressure of its international allies on Belgrade to "normalize" relations and stop the "de-recognition" campaign, in order to maintain the foreign policy asymmetry in international relations. In the domain of internal politics, Prishtina constantly exploits Serbia's key weakness, which is its inability to ensure security and normal living conditions for the local Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija. A large part of the concessions that the Albanian side received, through a series of agreements with Belgrade, were achieved with combination of US and EU pressure on Serbia and internal political, security and socio-economic pressure on the Serbian population in the southern Serbian province. The above-mentioned activities of Pristina were especially intensified after the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Increasingly frequent instrumentalization of violence and demonstration of force and the undertaking of unilateral and provocative moves are evident. The authorities in Pristina are obviously counting on the preoccupation of the USA, the EU and NATO with the war in Ukraine. Albanian political elite from Kosovo and Metohija are actively exploiting US and EU efforts to prevent the aforementioned conflict from spilling over into the Balkan region. The analysis of Prishtina's actions so far, shows the implementation of the their's attrition strategy towards the USA, the European Union and Belgrade. At the same time they are gradually strengthening the institutions of the new Albanian state and establishing the new political order in the entire territory of the Kosovo and Metohija, with intention to strengthen the internal and build external legitimacy of the so-called "Republic of Kosovo". In this long-term process, violence is skilfully used to exploit the weaknesses of the policies of the European Union and the USA in the region and to reduce and neutralize the influence of the Republic of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija. The strategy of the so-called "Republic of Kosovo" is not basically different from the rebel strategies of other non-state actors. The longterm goal of Pristina's strategy is to gradually build its own legitimacy and state institutions, while at the same time reducing the legitimacy and destroying political order of its opponents. In the last phase of this strategy, from the second half of 2023, the so-called "Kosovo Government", following Western counterinsurgency models, openly engaged on the complete dismantling of the "parallel" political system in the north of Kosovo and Metohija, using various instruments of political, security and economic coercion. Considering the weak reaction of the USA and the European Union, even more robust and energetic action by the government of the so-called "Republic of Kosovo" can be expected in order to completely remove any presence and influence of Serbia in the north of Kosovo. On the other hand, in the short term, Prishtina strives to make the concessions to the Serbian side as small and symbolic as possible. The formation of the Community/Association of Serbian Municipalities in Kosovo and Metohija with symbolic powers and responsibilities for them is a condition for the de-facto recognition of the so-called "Republic of Kosovo". In the long term, the constant and irreversible outflow of the Serbian population from Kosovo and Metohija, indicates that the actions of the so-called "Republic of Kosovo" on the ground are gradual assimilation, constant segregation and narrowing of the socio-economic and cultural space for Serbs, so that they would "voluntarily" leave Kosovo and Metohija and thus solve the Serbian problem according to the "Croatian model".
Publisher
Centre for Evaluation in Education and Science (CEON/CEES)
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